“Does he have it in him to be the woman?”: The Performance of Displacement in J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace by Wright, Laura
83
“Does he have it in him to be the woman?”: 
The Performance of Displacement 
in J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace
Laura Wright
Th is “being a man” and this “being a woman” are internally un-
stable aff airs. (Judith Butler “Gender is Burning”)
Saying . . . is performative, interlocutory . . . a relational pro-
cess rather than a fi xed relationship; it is movement, not stasis. 
(James Meff an and Kim L. Worthington on Emmanuel Levinas 
“Ethics before Politics: J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace”)
In South African author J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace (1999), the waiting that 
Brian May calls “an ethical alternative to empire” (414) and that informs 
South African fi ction of the 1980s, including Coetzee’s Waiting for the 
Barbarians (1980) and Life & Times of Michael K (1983), has come to 
an end, and the reader is positioned squarely in the “now” beyond the 
“not yet” of the interregnum, as Nadine Gordimer calls it, that charac-
terizes those earlier works. Disgrace is situated “in this place, at this time” 
(112), South Africa at the current post-apartheid moment, and focuses 
on the disgrace of David Lurie, a white South African academic who is 
forced to resign from his university teaching position after he engages 
in a questionably consensual sexual relationship with a young female 
student. After his resignation, Lurie leaves Cape Town to live with his 
daughter Lucy in the Eastern Cape and to work at the Animal Welfare 
League with Bev Shaw, a middle-aged woman whose job includes eutha-
nizing some of South Africa’s superfl uous pet and livestock population. 
In terms of Coetzee’s literary opus, the lesbian character of Lucy is the 
culmination of both the Magistrate and Michael K’s modes of resist-
ance in the 1980s era texts mentioned above. As the feminine principle 
that denies male determinism, she is a woman who works for change 
84
Lau r a  Wr i g h t
from within existing structures, a gardener who, unlike her predecessor 
Michael K, is able to partake of the tentative “bread of freedom” that 
she grows on the land she shares with Petrus, a black man who helps her 
care for the dogs she kennels. Such “freedom” is complex and uncertain, 
and when Lucy is raped by three black men she proclaims her decision 
not to report the crime a “private matter” (112). As an experience about 
which she will share no confession, her silence ends when she discovers 
that she is pregnant with a child she refuses to abort. Th erefore, Disgrace 
leaves us with two aspects that were impossible for Coetzee to depict 
more than a decade earlier: a living (yet co-opted) garden and a living 
(yet unborn) child. 
At its core, I read Disgrace as a text that engages with the concept 
of performance as a specifi c kind of narrative displacement, one that 
is dialogic and allows Coetzee to pose questions to his audience about 
any individual’s ability to experience the alterity of the other. My read-
ing of Disgrace involves an examination of two specifi c performances, 
David Lurie’s and J. M. Coetzee’s, as ultimately illustrative of David 
Lurie’s realization—however tentative—that one can never “be” the 
other, even if one can “write” the other into being. But there is also a 
third performance that takes place outside of the scope of Disgrace, J. 
M. Coetzee’s performative reading of the Elizabeth Costello Lectures, 
and I will foreground my discussion of Disgrace with a brief analysis 
of these lectures, particularly Th e Lives of Animals. While much has 
been written about the alterity of animals in Disgrace and Th e Lives of 
Animals (see Attridge and Graham), no critic has examined the per-
formative aspects of these works as a dual exercise in the enactment 
of trauma experienced in the lives of others—both for David Lurie in 
Disgrace via the opera he writes, and for Coetzee via Elizabeth Costello, 
the elderly, feminist novelist whose voice argues in Th e Lives of Animals, 
Coetzee’s 1997–98 Princeton Tanner Lectures, that the meat industry 
in the industrialized West is analogous to the murder of Jews during 
the Holocaust. In Disgrace, because he is present but “off stage,” locked 
in the bathroom during his daughter’s rape, Lurie attempts to imagine, 
through the writing of an operatic performance, the trauma experi-
enced by Lucy. For Coetzee, present through persistent dialogic ques-
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tions asked by the narrative voice, particularly “does [David] have it in 
him to be the woman?” (160), yet also “off stage” in the metafi ction, 
female bodies in Disgrace allow for a narrative performance about the 
limitations of the sympathetic imagination. After his daughter’s rape, 
David embarks upon the perhaps impossible quest to embody the 
other—in the form of black South Africans, women, and animals—
through the medium of a specifi c staged performance, an opera he 
struggles to write (but tellingly never completes) for Byron’s onetime 
lover, Teresa. 
I.
Displacement, claims Trinh T. Minh-Ha, is a mode of resistance in that 
it “involves the invention of new forms of subjectivities . . . of relation-
ships, which also implies the continuous renewal of values to which one 
refers in fabricating the tools of resistance” (217). Th e displacement that 
characterizes Disgrace is performative. It serves to shed light on subject 
positions that the author does not occupy by presenting the interac-
tion of multiple subjectivities as performed dialogue between not only 
the characters within the novel, but also between the inquisitive third-
person narrative voice and the reader, who must attempt to construct 
some answers. Coetzee, therefore, writes dialogically in the Bakhtinian 
sense, as one who refuses to claim the narrative position of the mono-
logic insider, the textual presence that has access to contested notions of 
the truth. Indeed, in discussing Dostoevsky’s status as a practitioner of 
the dialogic novel, Coetzee makes a case for the importance of the per-
formative in terms of dialogism: 
writing dialogically means writing in a manner which respects 
the knowledge of all who participate in the fi ction. It’s a notion 
that comes quite naturally to drama but doesn’t come so natu-
rally to long works of fi ction, because in drama there is a natu-
ral dialogue between the characters. In fi ction . . . there tends 
to be some controlling position, either latent or patent, some-
one who knows what’s going on in a way that the characters 
don’t. (Wachtel 44)
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While Coetzee does not write drama, most of his novels do refuse a con-
trolling narrative position and raise questions about embodiment as a 
kind of performance—acting as an alternate subjectivity—that is poten-
tially possible through imagined identifi cation with the suff ering of the 
other. In Disgrace, David Lurie attempts to imagine the subjectivity of 
his daughter after her rape, a task that is revealed as what I call “dialogic 
drag” by Coetzee’s performance of the narrative position of Elizabeth 
Costello in Elizabeth Costello (2003), a work that comprises various 
lectures presented by Coetzee and attributed to the fi ctional, feminist 
novelist for whom the collection is named. Such attempts at imagined 
identifi cation with the other, we learn from Elizabeth Costello’s exam-
ple, will always result in a performance that parodies the “real.” Included 
in Elizabeth Costello is Th e Lives of Animals (1999) a work that, because 
of its separate publication as a philosophical text/novella immediately 
preceded the publication of Disgrace and because of its implicit/explicit 
animal rights narrative, is often read as a “companion piece” to that 
novel.
In Th e Lives of Animals, the pair of lectures she presents at the fi c-
tional Appleton College, the female persona of Elizabeth Costello—“a 
Coetzeean fi gure” (Poyner 73)—compares the Holocaust in Germany 
to the treatment of animals in industrialized societies. Th e charac-
ter of Elizabeth Costello has also been performed by Coetzee in other 
lectures as well including the 1996 Ben Belitt Lecture at Bennington 
College, “What is Realism?”; the 1998 Una’s Lecture at the University 
of California, Berkeley, “Th e Novel in Africa”; and the 2002 Nexus 
Conference Lecture in the Netherlands, “Elizabeth Costello and the 
Problem of Evil.” In October of 2003, just after Coetzee was awarded 
the Nobel Prize in literature, he gave the Troy Lecture at the University 
of Massachusetts, Amherst. His reading, “At the Gate,” along with 
the other Costello lectures listed above, are constituents of the “Eight 
Lessons” that comprise Elizabeth Costello (2003). In each of these nar-
ratives, Costello/Coetzee explicitly acknowledges the role of perform-
ance in the construction and presentation of non-fi ctional lectures by 
a fi ctional persona through a non-fi ctional author about works of fi c-
tion. As Costello tells fi ctional Nigerian novelist Emmanuel Egundu 
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after he presents a exposition of the role of the body in uniquely African 
oral literature, “what you seem to be demanding is not just a voice but 
a performance: a living actor before you, performing your text” (“Th e 
Novel” 13). Furthermore, Coetzee addresses the author’s role as a per-
former of the narrative by disrupting his own presentation of Elizabeth 
Costello’s argument in “What is Realism?” by claiming that despite the 
fact that “generally speaking it is not a good idea to interrupt the narra-
tive too often,” he must skip certain aspects of her story in the interest 
of time: “the skips are not part of the text,” he claims, “they are part of 
the performance” (68) in the context of a postmodern moment when, 
according to the voice of Costello, “[writers] are just performers, speak-
ing our parts” (71). 
In terms of performance, such interruptions function as a narra-
tive Verfremdungseff ekt or alienation-eff ect characteristic of Brechtian 
theatre: 
in performance the actor ‘alienates’ rather than impersonates 
her character, she “quotes” or demonstrates the character’s be-
havior instead of identifying with it. Brecht theorizes that if the 
performer remains outside the character’s feelings, the audience 
may also and thus freely analyze and form opinions about the 
play’s “fable.” (Diamond 45, my emphasis)
In the context of the Costello lectures, the fable, a story that literally 
teaches lessons, is constructed as eight “lessons” in Elizabeth Costello, 
but the “moral” can only be determined by the audience’s dialogic en-
gagement with the issues that Costello raises; Costello/Coetzee does not 
provide easy answers but posits various and often objectionable options, 
thereby establishing grounds for debate and discussion. In these lessons, 
the act of embodiment is treated as performance, and the acknowledge-
ment of the mimicry inherent in the performance of another gender—
Costello as Coetzee—is also an acknowledgement of the limitations of 
the sympathetic imagination, the enactment that will never be “the real” 
but will always be, at best, a parody.
Coetzee discussed the concept of parody in October of 2003, right after 
he won the Nobel Prize in Literature. He delivered another Costello lec-
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ture at the University of Massachusetts, where I was a graduate student. 
Th e lecture was the fi nal lesson from Elizabeth Costello, “Th e Gate,” a 
narrative in which the eponymous Costello fi nds herself in a purgato-
ry of sorts, a self-conscious Kafkaesque “literary theme park” (208) (as 
the narrator claims, “Kafka reduced and fl attened to a parody” [209]) 
within which she examines and critiques the obviousness of the per-
formance that takes place all around her, asking “why is the make-up so 
poor? Why is the whole thing not done better?” (208). Coetzee’s aware-
ness of the parody that he enacts when he performs Elizabeth Costello 
was brought to the forefront when Coetzee stood before his audience in 
a packed auditorium and read Costello’s admission that “I do not give 
shows . . . I’m not an entertainer” (214). Th e audience was, no doubt, 
entertained by Coetzee’s reading, but the statement, made by Costello 
via Coetzee (or vice versa) created a space for discussion of the role of 
the writer, a space for dialogic interaction. Furthermore, Coetzee’s vari-
ous Costello readings as performance raise questions about the role of 
performance in his other works, as well as about the role that perform-
ance can play in gaining an understanding—without out usurping the 
voice—of an alternate identity. For Coetzee reading Costello, that per-
formance takes the form of a male author voicing the narrative of a 
female author to whom Coetzee has attributed many of his own char-
acteristics—particularly vegetarianism, a quality that is prominent in 
Th e Lives of Animals as well as in David’s examination of his daughter’s 
rape in Disgrace. Whenever Coetzee speaks before an audience, he tends 
to tell the story of Costello, of her speeches before other, fi ctional audi-
ences. Where is Coetzee’s voice in all of this, one wonders? I contend 
that it is the dialogic voice that exists behind the veneer of the woman 
who raises topics with which the audience must engage, who asks ques-
tions that the audience is compelled to answer. Th is particular kind of 
uniquely Coetzeean performance is a tool that I have termed “dialogic 
drag.” 
Judith Butler claims that “drag is a site of a certain ambivalence, one 
which refl ects the more general situation of being implicated in the re-
gimes of power by which one is constituted and hence being impli-
cated in the very regime one opposes” (“Gender” 125). As a form of 
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displacement and renegotiation of power, she claims that drag is not 
always a form of ridicule nor is it merely a way of “passing” as some-
thing that one is not. Furthermore, and perhaps most important to a 
study of Disgrace and the Costello lectures, drag is not exclusively the 
realm of male, homosexual performance. Th e performance of a gen-
dered position, however, is an attempt to understand the unintelligi-
ble aspects—or alterity—of the other, and as such illustrates an exercise 
in the enactment of the sympathetic imagination. In the case of the 
Costello Lectures, “drag” is theoretical, a dialogic device that allows the 
author to appear as himself but to perform a voice through which he 
can raise questions and, possibly, incite controversy and debate without 
providing any concrete answers—that is, without occupying the posi-
tion of monologic insider. In the Costello Lectures, Coetzee can “be” 
the woman, but only because that woman is a male-authored creation, a 
self-conscious parody of womanhood, and a dialogic catalyst for discus-
sion, particularly discussion about one’s ability to know or be the Other, 
the very dilemma that unsettles David Lurie in Disgrace.
II.
In Disgrace, David Lurie, a “representative of the dislocated post-apart-
heid white writer” (Poyner 68), is displaced by virtue of his status as 
white, academic, and male in a political context that no longer treats 
such attributes as defi nitive. Further, by virtue of an illicit sexual rela-
tionship with a young female student named Melanie, Lurie is displaced 
(and disgraced) when he is driven from a university that will not “in this 
day and age” (44)—post-apartheid South Africa—tolerate such behav-
ior, especially given Lurie’s refusal to grant a confession of any wrong-
doing despite his admission of guilt, that he “became a servant of Eros” 
(52). But after Lucy’s rape on her smallholding in the Eastern Cape, it 
becomes impossible to view David’s interaction with Melanie as mere 
seduction, his treatment of her as anything other than the “abuse” (53) 
of which he is accused by a female member of the university disciplinary 
committee. In Disgrace, women’s bodies signify as sites of displacement; 
for the black men who rape her, Lucy’s white female body symbolizes 
the land from which they have been dispossessed. For David, Melanie’s 
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biracial female body off ers the opportunity to symbolically reclaim 
not only his youth, but also his authoritarian position at a university 
where the white male professor is marginalized by increasing demands 
of gender and racial diversifi cation. In the case of both women, one 
runs the risk of reading their bodies on a purely symbolic level, as meta-
phors that inform the men who enact varying degrees of violence upon 
them. Without the overt trauma of the second event—overt in the sense 
that David is locked in a bathroom and set on fi re while Lucy is raped 
off stage and overt also in the problematic sense that Lucy is white and 
her attackers are black—the more implicit trauma of the “seduction” of 
Melanie by David might be overlooked. 
In the Freudian understanding, according to Ariella Azoulay, “trauma 
. . . is given its meaning only when it is experienced a second time, 
only in retroactive fashion when it is articulated and told to an ad-
dressee” (34–35), or, I would contend, only when it is re-enacted and 
thereby performed before an audience. Azoulay argues that in Disgrace, 
Lucy’s rape (the second rape) becomes the narrative articulation of 
Melanie’s rape (the fi rst rape). It is the second violation that reveals the 
trauma of the fi rst, a trauma often unrecognized by many of Coetzee’s 
critics who, according to Lucy Graham, dismiss the incident between 
Lurie and Melanie as an aff air. Such an interpretation is understand-
able given that the narrative of the “relationship” is written through 
Lurie as a focalizer, but according to Graham, “although Lurie protests 
to the contrary, the act he commits is rape” (7). Whether Lurie protests 
is questionable; it is perhaps more accurate to say that no character in 
the novel, as well as few of Coetzee’s critics, questions the narrative 
voice in its biased assertions. For example, the narrative interpretation 
of Melanie’s smile as “sly rather than shy” (11) should be suspect given 
David’s desire to view Melanie as complicit in their sexual encoun-
ters. Only by recognizing parallels between the two young women, the 
fi rst non-white, the second white, and the parallels between the white 
David Lurie and the black rapists in the latter part of the novel is the 
reader able to recognize David’s earlier encounters with Melanie as in-
stances of violation. Similarly, the performative aspects of Disgrace, the 
later text, can be revealed by a brief analysis of the overt performance 
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of female enactment in the Costello lectures in general, especially in 
the earlier Lives of Animals. 
Disgrace has been treated harshly by some critics both for its treat-
ment of the post-apartheid status of the “new” South Africa and for 
Coetzee’s creation of David Lurie, a character with whom readers feel 
unable to empathize. For example, in a 2003 article in Scrutiny2, Colin 
Bower claims, “I simply cannot see how . . . David Lurie can be taken 
as anything less than repellent,” and, within a twenty-page critical ex-
amination of Coetzee’s work, ironically fi nds Lurie (as well as the rest of 
Coetzee’s opus) “quite unworthy of any sort of critical attention” (14). 
According to Salman Rushdie, the novel’s damning weakness is the in-
ability of its characters to understand one another: “Lurie does not un-
derstand Lucy . . . and she fi nds his deeds beyond her;” furthermore, 
“whites don’t understand blacks, and the blacks aren’t interested in un-
derstanding the whites” (A19). However contentious Rushdie’s claim 
may be—one could argue that the only character who does not under-
stand anyone else is David Lurie since the novel is focalized through 
his point of view—a lack of understanding in “this place, at this time” 
is the necessary product of a postcolonial and post-apartheid narrative 
about shifting and renegotiated power in an historical moment fraught 
with various racially and sexually determined displacements. In addi-
tion, such critical dismissals can be read as evidence of a refusal by the 
critic to engage dialogically with the dilemma of identifi cation posed by 
Coetzee.
In Disgrace, this dilemma is raised when the third-person narrative 
voice asks of David, “does he have it in him to be the woman?” (160) as 
he attempts, unsuccessfully, to imagine Lucy’s rape from her perspective. 
David, seeming to recognize—however obscurely—the animal rights 
argument posed by Elizabeth Costello in Th e Lives of Animals, does ul-
timately empathize with the bodily suff ering his daughter endures by 
unconsciously placing the rape of women in an analogous relationship 
to the slaughter of livestock animals. After Lucy’s rape, David forms a 
bond with two Persian sheep that Petrus plans to slaughter, and he is 
disinclined to eat them because “suddenly and without reason, their lot 
has become important to him” (126). While David never actively par-
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ticipates in a vegetarian ethic, his sensibility with regard to the lives of 
animals is greatly altered after Lucy is raped, and this change in percep-
tion results from a respect for the being of animals regardless of whether 
or not David can access the animal’s interiority. If Elizabeth Costello in 
Th e Lives of Animals is Coetzee’s performative parody of an academic, 
vegetarian woman, , who asserts the highly problematic claim that as a 
writer of fi ction, she does have it in her to be an animal (“if I can think 
my way into the existence of a being who has never existed, then I can 
think my way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an oyster” 
35), then Disgrace is Coetzee’s critique of the vanity of such an asser-
tion. At best, as David discovers—whether he is consciously aware of 
his discovery or not—one can mimic or parody the subjectivity of the 
other, but to claim that one can actually be or “think [one’s] way into 
the existence” of another is arrogant indeed. And Coetzee, through the 
character of Susan Moebius, makes this point in another Costello lec-
ture entitled “What is Realism?” When Elizabeth’s son John tells Susan 
that in her fi ction, “my mother has been a man . . . she has also been a 
dog,” Susan counters, “it’s just mimicry. Women are good at mimicry, 
better than men. At parody, even” (73). If we subvert this claim and take 
Susan at her word, then Coetzee’s embodiment of Elizabeth Costello 
can be read as the parody that must inform David’s attempts to “be” 
Lucy in Disgrace.
Much recent criticism of Disgrace, with its attention to the role of 
secular confession in a world “in the absence of grace” (Graham 4) 
where “animals and art provide the substance of Lurie’s new existence” 
(Attridge 108), can be read in defense of its bleak and seemingly nega-
tive portrayal of South Africa. Jane Poyner reads the novel “as an allegory 
of the Truth [and Reconciliation] Commission within the framework of 
(secular) confession” (67), while Mike Marais, James Meff an, and Kim 
L. Worthington tease out a discourse of Levinas’s concept of alterity as 
it pertains to Coetzee’s treatment of the other. Marais defends Coetzee’s 
respect for the alterity of the other by claiming, “in refl ecting on its fail-
ure to represent the other, the text refl ects on the excession of the other. 
Th e point here is that the text’s failure to instantiate the other is also a 
failure to eliminate the other” (60–61). Meff an and Worthington argue 
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that Lurie’s act of self-refl ective doubt, inherent when the narrator asks, 
“does he have it in him to be the woman?” may be ethically productive, 
a “question whose terms recognize another’s perhaps insurmountable al-
terity” (144). Th e essential point extrapolated by Coetzee’s critics from 
the perspective of Levinasian philosophy deals with the notion that one 
can never fully comprehend the other and must respect the alterity—
the insurmountable diff erence—of the other despite the impossibility 
of imagined identifi cation with the other. Such respect begins with self-
questioning inherently located in the act of “Saying”: “the Spirit is not 
the Said, it is the Saying which goes from the Same to the Other, with-
out suppressing the diff erence. It paves a way for itself where there is 
nothing in common” (Levinas 63). But Levinas’s notion of alterity is 
applicable only to other humans and fails to encompass the various non-
human others that populate Coetzee’s narratives. 
Various critics read the role of animals in Disgrace as the means by 
which David Lurie begins to learn to love the “absolute other” (Attridge 
114) by taking responsibility for the bodies of dead dogs despite the 
fact, as Lucy Graham claims, “that Lurie’s work in the service of dead 
dogs is not redemptive in itself ” (11). Attridge claims that Disgrace is 
not so much about postcolonial South Africa as it is about the cultural 
colonization of South Africa by the West. According to Attridge, the 
novel is a portrayal of “a new global age of performance indicators and 
outcomes measurement, of bench marking and quality assurance, of a 
widespread prurience that’s also an unfeeling puritanism” (105). Louise 
Bethlehem points to the theatrical way that the text deals with these 
confl icting notions of prurience and puritanism when she says, “if the 
rape of Lucy takes place off stage . . . then so too does the enactment of her 
sexual pleasure” (22, my emphasis). Such a claim, while it describes the 
absence of Lucy’s narrative perspective, her confession of either trauma 
or joy, also alludes to the ways in which the text is staged by Coetzee and 
performed by the characters that populate it.
Furthermore, David, in his attempts to imagine Lucy’s rape from her 
perspective, constructs a fi ctionalized narrative of her experience—as 
she claims, “you behave as if everything I do is part of the story of your 
life” (198)—that runs up against his work on Byron, “something for 
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the stage. . . . Words and music. Characters talking and singing” (63). 
In fact, Disgrace is fi lled with references to various theaters, perform-
ances, and enactments, stagings of narratives that are never completed 
and that ultimately parody the truth of what they attempt to portray. 
When Lurie asks Melanie about her studies, she tells him that she is 
majoring in “stagecraft and design. I’m going for a diploma in theatre” 
(14). And when he watches her rehearsing the play Sunset at the Globe 
Salon, “a comedy of the new South Africa set in a hairdressing salon in 
Hillbrow, Johannesburg” (23), he becomes the unknown voyeur of her 
enactment of a character within the play within Coetzee’s staging of 
David’s narrative. David is drawn to the character, the “apparition on 
the stage” (25) that Melanie becomes as he watches her perform. Th e 
play, in David’s opinion, is ridiculous: “all the coarse old prejudices [are] 
brought into the light of day and washed away in gales of laughter” (23), 
and when he goes to see the performance at the end of the novel, “he 
fi nds the play, with its crude humor and nakedly political intent, as hard 
to endure as before” (191). Humor and humility, however, are what he 
ultimately depends on, as he uses Lucy’s banjo—an instrument created 
and fi rst played by black Africans (see Conway 135)—to hybridize and 
shape his own historical narrative of the middle-aged Teresa, an Italian 
aristocrat who “looks more like a peasant” (181), more, in fact, like Bev 
Shaw than Melanie.
Th e transition from writing about Byron for whom he can fi nd 
words to writing about Teresa, “young, greedy, willful, petulant” (181) 
for whom he cannot, takes place after his altercation with Melanie, a 
woman he imagines as similarly young, willful, and demanding. But 
the focus of his theatrical endeavour shifts again to Teresa in middle age 
after he meets Bev Shaw, the “remarkably unattractive” (82), middle-
aged woman who euthanizes South Africa’s unwanted animals. Initially 
glib about his feelings for animals and his consumption of them (“do I 
like animals? I eat them so I suppose I must like them” [81]), David ul-
timately becomes completely “gripped by what happens in the theatre” 
(143) of the Animal Welfare League, the staging and dramatic enact-
ment of a kind of ritualized and honorable death for animals—mainly 
dogs—at the hands of Bev Shaw. Of Teresa and, I would argue, of Bev 
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the narrator asks, “can he fi nd it in his heart to love this plain, ordinary 
woman?” (182), a question that provides a kind of answer to the earlier 
question after Lucy’s rape. While David may not ever be able to “be” the 
woman, he may possibly come to love a woman who is ordinary, not 
young, and who may be able to guide him in a productive direction. 
He realizes the limits of imagined identifi cation with Lucy and comes 
to accept that the best he can do or the closest he can approximate is a 
kind of performance, a mimetic parody of an unrepresentable alterity: 
“this is how it must be from here on: Teresa giving voice to her lover, 
and [David], the man in the ransacked house, giving voice to Teresa” 
(183)—while Coetzee gives voice to him. Th e voice of the man (Byron) 
is mediated through the voice of the woman (Teresa) as it is mediated 
through the voice of man (David) in Disgrace. While David wants to let 
Teresa tell her story of Byron, the story she can tell in his opera is still 
only the story that he writes for her, the narrative he imagines being 
performed by another woman, an actor, who will be neither Teresa nor 
his idea of her. Th at David is never able to complete his opera illustrates 
both a failure of the sympathetic imagination and, conversely, a testa-
ment to an unarticulated understanding that the alterity of the other, in 
this case Teresa, is never representable, never successfully performed. 
 In a moment that harkens back to the seeming ridiculousness David 
critiques in Sunset at the Globe Salon, he realizes the impossibility of at-
tempting to voice Teresa in the context of the South African here and 
now. When he realizes his own apparent absurdity as he “sits among the 
dogs singing to himself ” (212) while three boys from D Village watch 
him over the fence, he questions whether it would be permissible to 
allow an animal into the play to voice its own story. After all, a narra-
tive of trauma infl icted upon animal bodies, “who come nowhere” (73) 
on the list of South Africa’s priorities after the fall of apartheid, is more 
relevant, certainly, than the story of Teresa’s lost love: “would he dare 
. . . bring a dog into the piece, allow it to loose its own lament to the 
heavens between the strophes of lovelorn Teresa’s? Why not? Surely, in 
a work that will never be performed, all things are permitted?” (215). 
Such questions are characteristic of the text after Lucy’s rape as the nar-
rative perspective shifts from a voice of relative certainty to a dialogic 
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voice that challenges the validity and veracity of David’s choices, be-
liefs, and conceptions of the self. Th is questioning, according to Meff an 
and Worthington, is perhaps ethically productive because it points to 
David’s realization of the limits of his own perception, but “what will 
gall the reader, and probably incite new criticism of Coetzee’s quietism,” 
they claim, “is his refusal in Disgrace to do more than suggest the need 
to ask new questions of the self ” (146). For the most part, however, the 
questions that the narrative asks are not questions that David asks of 
himself, but are instead questions the third-person narrator asks about 
David’s position in the narrative. From the narrator’s question, “does he 
have it in him to be the woman?” follow others. After asking, “can he 
fi nd it in his heart to love this plain, ordinary woman [Teresa in middle 
age]?” (182), the narrator later asks, “how can he ever explain,” in the 
context of the current historical moment, “what Teresa and her lover 
have done to deserve being brought back to this world?” (212). But one 
of the few questions that David asks of himself is about animals and 
about his revulsion to eating meat after Lucy’s rape, and it is this ques-
tion that seemingly references Coetzee’s performance of Costello in Th e 
Lives of Animals and that leads to ethical respect for the other despite 
Lurie’s inability to “be” the other.
III.
Th e colonizing impulse to treat people like animals is apparent through-
out Coetzee’s opus from his fi rst work of fi ction Dusklands (1974) in 
which Jacobus claims “death is as obscure to [the bushman] as to an 
animal” (80). Coetzee deconstructs such othering in Boyhood (1997) 
when the autobiographical character of John becomes averse to the aes-
thetic of meat and in Life & Times of Michael K when Michael’s hunger 
for the ethical begins with the slaughter of a goat and ends with a purely 
vegetarian—albeit minimal—mode of consumption. In Disgrace, when 
Petrus tethers two sheep to a bare patch of ground days before he plans 
to slaughter them, David becomes agitated and advocates for their re-
moval to a place where they might graze. When he ponders the bond 
that has formed between himself and the sheep, the narrative lets the 
reader into David’s thoughts: “do I have to change, he thinks? Do I have 
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to become like Bev Shaw?” (126, my emphasis). Earlier in the novel, we 
learn that Lucy is a longtime vegetarian who “refuses to touch meat” 
(121), but David’s aversion to meat begins to take shape, for reasons he 
cannot fully understand, only after Lucy is raped. 
When she asks him if he has changed his mind about the way he 
feels about animals, he claims, “no, I have not changed my ideas. . . . 
Nevertheless, in this case I am disturbed. I can’t say why” (127, my 
emphasis). It is David’s inability to say what changes his feelings for 
animals that is signifi cant in terms of performance and identifi cation. 
Being unable to articulate is also being unable to speak for, being 
unable to voice the suff ering and trauma of the other; the connection 
is not imagined, is not Costello’s arrogant claim that she “can think 
[her] way into the existence of a bat or a chimpanzee or an oyster” 
(35). Th e connection is visceral, felt, quite literally, in the gut. It is a 
physical reaction to suff ering, not an intellectualized exercise in mime-
sis; it is the bodily realization that one cannot “be” the other, but that 
empathy is possible regardless. When David does eat the mutton at 
Petrus’s party, he tells himself that he will “ask forgiveness afterwards” 
(131). Despite the fact that David cannot say what brings about this 
particular disturbance, the connections between the bodies of women 
and animals are apparent within the text; David, therefore, may not 
be able to “be” the woman—his daughter, Teresa, or Melanie—but 
he seems to be able, at least on a physical level, to empathize with 
the trauma infl icted on women through rape by recognizing, through 
his body in the form of its revulsion to meat, the trauma infl icted on 
animals through slaughter. In a rhetorical context, women are treated 
“like meat” when they are raped, a metaphor that underscores David’s 
subsequent relationships with animals who literally become meat when 
they are killed.
Of this connection, Carol J. Adams asks in Th e Sexual Politics of Meat, 
“what connects being a receptacle and being a piece of meat, being en-
tered and being eaten?” and answers, “if you are a piece of meat, you 
are subject to a knife, to implemental violence” (54). Lucy articulates 
the connection between woman, animal, and meat when she confronts 
David about his similarity to the men who raped her:
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You are a man, you ought to know. When you have sex with 
someone strange—when you trap her, hold her down, get her 
under you, put all your weight on her—isn’t it a bit like kill-
ing? Pushing the knife in; exiting afterwards, leaving the body 
behind covered in blood—doesn’t it feel like murder, like get-
ting away with murder? (158)
David, despite his inability to make the connection between his rape of 
Melanie and this rape of Lucy, can identify with the rapists and also em-
ploys the language of consumption when he imagines how the men must 
have felt as they raped Lucy and “drank up her fear” (160). In terms of 
rape, the body of woman becomes so closely elided with the rhetoric of 
meat that the animal, according to Adams, becomes an “absent referent” 
because “animals in name and body are made absent as animals for meat 
to exist” (40). In Disgrace, David’s question to himself about whether he 
must change and become like Bev does two extremely productive things. 
First, within the context of the novel, it illustrates a shift (or at the very 
least the potential for a shift) in David’s thinking about Bev in particu-
lar and women in general. If he is inclined to be more “like Bev”—and 
by being disturbed by the slaughter of sheep, he has become more like 
her (whatever this may mean) than he may be prepared to admit—then 
he may be more inclined to be guided by a woman’s compassion than 
“enriched” (56) by a physical relationship with her. Second, he restores 
the absent referent of the animal to the text and, through the animal, 
can form an empathetic identifi cation with the woman—or at least with 
Lucy, who has been treated like an animal by a group of people—black 
South African men—who have, in turn, historically been treated like 
animals within the context of South African colonial history. David can 
give up the quest to perform Teresa and continue, instead, to work with 
Bev Shaw in the service of animals.
Th e body of the animal, then, in particular the body of the dog that 
David “sacrifi ces” at the end of the narrative is a body, not a symbolic 
representation of Lucy or of any of the other characters in the novel. 
While David’s “giving up” of the animal can be read as his “giving up” 
of his daughter, it is through the dog himself that David learns to give 
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without expecting anything in return. David can love the dog because 
he has accepted responsibility for the dog as a being inherently entitled 
to love. Th is reciprocity, this “little enough, less than little: nothing” 
(220), in its potential for ethical productivity, is, in many ways, utterly 
promising. Lucy agrees to marry Petrus and give him her land in return 
for his protection, and David is appalled at Lucy’s decision to place her-
self in a position he views as humiliating, as a person forced to live “like 
a dog” (205). But for Lucy, this is a place of beginning, “a good place to 
start from again” (205). Coetzee’s relation to Franz Kafka has been in-
tensely scrutinized (see Attwell, Dovey, Merivale, and Wright), and here 
he rewrites Franz Kafka’s existential ending in Th e Trial when Joseph K 
proclaims his fate to be “like a dog” (231) and renders literal the condi-
tion of both humans and animals in the new South Africa. For change 
to occur, it would seem, everyone must begin again from the same place, 
with the liberation of the land from its contested historical status. To 
begin “like a dog” is simply to start over, and the literary and historically 
negative connotation of the simile is itself essentially negated.
Lucy, therefore, may be able to imagine living “like a dog” even 
though David is unable to “be the woman,” to imaginatively perform 
the characters of Teresa or Lucy or even Bev. In fact, the one woman 
whose subjectivity David can imagine is another woman, like David’s 
Teresa, written into being by a man, Gustav Flaubert’s Madame Bovary. 
Not incidentally, when Flaubert was brought to court on charges of ob-
scenity and asked to identify the “real” Madame Bovary, he made the 
now famous claim, “Madame Bovary, c’est moi.” Such a statement, as 
both the author’s claim of imagined identifi cation with the woman and 
simultaneous refusal of some expected confession, is certainly not lost 
on Coetzee with regard to David Lurie. 
Early in the novel after an encounter with the prostitute Soraya, 
David imagines himself as “Emma Bovary, coming home sated, glazen-
eyed, from an afternoon of reckless fucking” (5), and later in the novel, 
after he fi rst sleeps with Bev, “his thoughts go to Emma Bovary strut-
ting before the mirror after her fi rst big afternoon. I have a lover! I have 
a lover! sings Emma to herself. Well, let poor Bev Shaw go home and 
do some singing too” (150). Emma Bovary, the fi ctional woman imag-
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ined by a man, becomes the fi ctional woman enacted by David Lurie 
in his relationship with Soraya and the fi ctional conceit he uses to im-
agine Bev Shaw—herself a fi ctional woman imagined by another man, 
Coetzee—and her delight in their sexual encounter. If David can be any 
woman, she is only the woman interpreted through the gaze of another 
man—Byron, Flaubert, or Coetzee. 
When Joanna Scott asked Coetzee what it meant for him to write 
from the perspective of his female narrator Magda in In the Heart of the 
Country (1982), he answered,
A complicated question. One way of responding is to ask, is 
one, as a writer, at every level sexed? Is there not a level where 
one is, if not presexual, then anterior to sex? First anterior to 
sex, then becoming sexed? At that level, or in that transition 
between levels, does one actually “take on” the voice of another 
sex? Doesn’t one “become” another sex? (91)
As an answer, this one seems particularly evasive and provocative, illus-
trative of Coetzee’s ability to question, if not state a fi rm belief in, the 
notion that the writer must at the very least attempt to embody and per-
form other subjectivities. Scott’s question mirrors the narrator’s question 
of David Lurie in Disgrace: “does he have it in him to be the woman?” 
(160), and the answer to this question, when one looks at the performa-
tive nature of Disgrace, is a resounding—but not at all negatively con-
notated—no. While one can never be the other, on an ethical level, one 
must continue to attempt to imagine the subjectivity of that which one 
is not, and, more importantly, one must continue to respect the alterity 
of that which cannot be imagined. 
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